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I. INTRODUCTION
In the unique novel set in South Florida, Naked Came the Manatee,
thirteen talented authors created a "literary game of telephone" whereby each
wrote a chapter and then passed it on to the next contributor, who did his best
to craft a plot line.' The result was a novel of "wildly fluctuating styles and
more crazy plot curves than a daytime drama, but thanks to these ... masters
of the craft, this roller coaster of a book is almost as much fun to read as it
obviously was to write." 2 After reading the recent opinions of the fifteen
judges from the International Court of Justice in the Case Concerning Oil
Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America),3 one cannot
help but believe the Court has just issued its legal version of "Naked Came the
Doctrine of Self-Defense." The masters of the craft of legal writing have
combined fluctuating legal styles, jurisprudential plot turns, and creative
avoidances with tortured analysis to produce a roller coaster of an opinion
t Visiting Professor, National War College, Washington, D.C., 2002-2003; Professor of
Law, Roger Williams University School of Law. I would like to give special thanks to Trudi Rishikof
for her assistance, David P. Auerswald, Kevin Keith, Robert Louis, Michael Mazarr, and Theresa
Saboinis-Helf for their help and comments, and Patrick Bratton for his research and comments. I would
like to especially thank Professor Harvey M. Sapolsky, Director of Security Studies Program at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Professor Elizabeth Rapaport and the University of Connecticut
Law School Students Society Forum, and Professor Timothy D. Lytton at Albany Law School for
graciously allowing me to present many of these ideas. In addition, the comments of the Yale Journal of
International Law editorial staff were extremely generous. The views expressed in this contribution are
those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Defense University,
the National War College, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
I. See CARL HIAASEN ET AL., NAKED CAME THE MANATEE (1996). The creative ploy was
borrowed from a trashy "noir novel," Naked Came the Stranger, by Penelope Ashe, which in reality was
a pseudonym representing a collaboration of twenty-four journalists. See PENELOPE ASHE, NAKED CAME
THE STRANGER (1969).
2. Editorial Review-Naked Came the Manatee, Amazon.com, at www.amazon.com (last
visited June 12, 2004).
3. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.) (Merits), 2003 I.C.J. (Nov. 6), http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idecisions.htm. All references to Oil Platforms are to the merits phase of the case unless
otherwise specified.
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with more separate and dissenting opinions than the original novel, now set in
the Hague.
Under international law and the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, "a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in
the light of its object and purpose. ' 4 To do otherwise, in the words of the
Vienna Convention, would result in an interpretation that would be
"manifestly absurd or unreasonable." 5 The International Court of Justice, by
violating the basic principles of statutory interpretation of the Convention, has
managed to produce an opinion that is both absurd and unreasonable in Oil
Platforms, which arose from the Persian Gulf Tanker War of 1980-1988.
Or in the words of the some of the judges: the Court has "followed a
formalistic and disconnected approach in its reasoning"; 6 has demonstrated
"half-heartedness" 7 in dealing with questions; has followed an "unnecessarily
convoluted and questionable way";8 or the "structure of the Judgment is not in
keeping either with what would be expected of the Court or with the Court's
usual practice. It is not well balanced, does not sufficiently reflect the factual
context of the case and is not a transparent, well-defined reply . . . ,;9 or,
finally, "elements of the Court's reasoning and methodology seem to me to be
problematic."' 0 No one, including the judges, appeared content with the result.
II. THE INTERNATIONAL SETTING FOR THE CASE: THE LEGAL CONTEXT
Briefly, the Tanker War directly involved two incidents that triggered a
United States military response for the purpose of the case. On October 16,
1987, a missile hit the "reflagged" Kuwaiti tanker, Sea Isle City. Three days
later, in response, the United States attacked and destroyed the Reshadat and
Resalat oil platform complexes. On April 14, 1988, the warship USS Samuel
B. Roberts struck a mine in international waters near Bahrain. Five days later
the United States, asserting self-defense, struck and destroyed the Nasr and
Salman complexes." Iran sued the United States for this action on the basis of
the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights.12 In its
counter-claim and defense, the United States pled that under Article XX,
4. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31, U.N. Doe. A/CONF.
39/27, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340 (1980).
5. Id. art. 32(b), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340.
6. Oil Platforms (dissenting opinion of Judge A1-Khasawneh), para. 6. For this judge,
however, both the Iranian claim and the United States counter-claim should have been admitted, see id.
para. 7.
7. Oil Platforms (separate opinion of Judge Simma), para. 6.
8. Oil Platforms (separate opinion of Judge Owada), para. 2.
9. Oil Platforms (separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans), para. 2.
10. Oil Platforms (separate opinion of Judge Higgins), para. 2.
11. Oil Platforms, para. 25.
12. The court rejected the proposition that general provisions in Article I of the 1955 Treaty
granted jurisdiction of a violation, but held that Article XXI, paragraph 2 of the Treaty granted
jurisdiction and that Article X, paragraph 1, which states that "[b]etween the territories of the Two High
Contracting Parties there shall be freedom of commerce and navigation," may have been violated. See
id. para. 31.
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paragraph l(d) of the Treaty, it had exercised its right of protecting its
essential security interests.' 
3
The Court rejected the U.S. claim of self-defense and clearly stated the
burden the United States was to carry: "The United States must also show that
its actions were necessary and proportional to the armed attack made on it,
and that the platforms were a legitimate military target open to attack in the
exercise of self-defence."1 4 On one level the facts of the United States' use of
force are not in dispute, although the Court as a fact finder concluded that the
United States had not carried "the burden of proof of the existence of an
armed attack by Iran on the United States, in the form of the missile attack on
the Sea Isle City."'15 While on the question of whether the USS Samuel B.
Roberts was struck by a mine laid by Iran, the Court held that the "evidence is
highly suggestive, but not conclusive."
' 6
As a consequence of this analysis, the Court concluded that the attacks
on the platforms had not been shown to be justifiable in response to an "armed
attack" on the United States by Iran, nor had the United States demonstrated
the significance of the military presence and activity on the oil platforms.' 7 On
the issues of "proportionality and necessity, the Court found that the April
response was not proportional in the context since it also was part of a larger
military operation, "Operation Praying Mantis," whereby two frigates and a
number of other naval vessels and aircraft were destroyed. The Court could
not "close its eyes to the scale" of the military operation.'
8
However, there was no violation of Article X, paragraph 1 (the "freedom
of commerce") by the United States because Executive Order 12613, an
embargo signed on October 29, 1987, prohibiting the import of Iranian goods
and services of Iranian origin, had ended trade.' 9 In a judicial sleight of hand,
the Court reasoned that since an embargo was in force, no commerce was
taking place, so ipso facto there was no freedom of commerce to infringe
upon-thus no reparations when Salmon and Nasr were destroyed. 20
Moreover, since the platforms at Reshadat and Resalat had been previously
attacked by Iraq, there was nothing to damage with respect to trade. In a
similar legerdemain, the Court dismissed the Iranian procedural objections to
the U.S. counter-claim, 21 and then denied the claim by holding that to recover,
the United States had to prove "that the vessels which were attacked were
engaged in commerce or navigation between the territories of the United
13. The relevant section of Article XX, paragraph 1(d) states that the Treaty shall not preclude
the application of measures "necessary to fulfill the obligations of a High Contracting Party for the
maintenance or restoration of international peace and security, or necessary to protect its essential
security interests." Id. para. 32.
14. Id. para. 51.
15. Id. para. 61.
16. Id. para. 71.
17. Id. paras. 72, 76.
18. Id. para. 77.
19. Id. para. 90. The Court noted with surprise that, because Iran made no formal submission
or claim that the embargo was itself a violation of Article X, it was waived, although the Court had
concerns, and Iran continued to argue that the United States' invocation of Article XX was not justified,
id. para. 94.
20. Id. para. 98.
21. Id. paras. 103-18.
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States and Iran." 22 The Court then listed ten incidents and, under a strict
definition of "engaged in commerce or navigation between the territories,"
rejected them all. So, there was no violation of the Treaty by either party, yet
the Court felt compelled to engage in a long analysis on "direct versus
indirect" commerce, and a new analysis on "self-defense," "proportionality,"
"necessity," and the role of the Court to interpret economic treaties in the light
of Articles 2(4) and 51 of the U.N. Charter. This tortured legal route then
results in a flurry of separate opinions, concurrences, and dissents. Next case!
There are a number of ways to think about and analyze the significance
of this case. One is to review closely the analysis of the majority opinion and
dissect its logic on the issues of: (a) the manner in which "accountability" for
the attacks on the United States ships take place-how the fact finding for
liability is inconclusive and how one judge attempts to introduce the concept
of "market share liability" and finds comparative jurisprudence from X, Y, and
Z countries to justify the introduction of a new international norm; (b)
"commercial activity," the concept of third party economic relations, and the
legalistic manner by which the concept of "embargo" was "nuanced,"
meaning that the treaty provisions were not triggered; or (c) the legitimate use
of the international concept of "self defense" under Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter, given the current debate over the U.S. doctrine announced in the
current National Security Strategy of "preemption" versus "prevention., 24 The
last approach would focus the debate on the legal terms of "necessity,"
"immediacy," and "proportionality," as well as "rules of armed conflict." The
discussion would help determine whether an arbitration was called for before
force was legitimately used or whether the attack was too attenuated in
relation to the acts of alleged aggression perpetrated by the Iranians. These
discussions would not only be significant in and of themselves, but would also
cast light on issues that will become increasingly important to the
international community as the United States continues to prosecute the global
war on terrorism.
22. Id. para. 119.
23. Id. para. 120.
24. See THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA (2002), http://www.cdi.org/national-security-strategy. Section V, "Prevent Our Enemies from
Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction," states:
We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are
able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our
allies and friends....
The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter
a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of
inaction- and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend
ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. To




III. THE INTERNATIONAL SETTING FOR THE CASE: THE POLITICAL CONTEXT
In the final analysis, any of the legal approaches described above would
be plausible and could constitute a fascinating law review article. I prefer,
however, to place the case in the broader context of international law and
international politics. Raymond Aron, in his classic work on international
relations, Peace and War, stipulated that in the international arena ultimately
only three regimes of power among nations were possible: equilibrium
(balance of power,) hegemony, and empire. 25 A balance of power occurs
when competing states, as in the Cold War, create a peace by counter-balance
in order to avert the danger of power becoming unevenly distributed. 26 In a
period of hegemonic power, order is usually established and maintained, by a
single dominant power in conjunction with and in cooperation with other
powers.27 The imperial state, however, "reserves to itself the monopoly of
legitimate violence. 28
These three regimes evaluate the legitimate projection of force inside the
international system somewhat differently. A "balance of power" regime
might under certain circumstances foster a regime of international law and
normsjus cogens, adjudicated by a United Nations and an International Court
of Justice. Such a system would, like a domestic court system of adjudication,
use objective versus subjective standards to determine when the use of force
was a legitimate act of self-defense. In a system where "hegemony" rules,
however, how the hegemon acts, and then how the hegemon responds to the
use of such an international court as it establishes its own definition of
legitimate use of power, simultaneously affects the efficacy of the
international adjudicative system and how the allies of the hegemon view its
behavior. Naturally, where one has established an "empire," the final arbiter
of the legitimacy of the justification for a projection of force (whether as an
act of self-defense or for imperial interests) is the internal imperial legislature
or internal legitimizing political organ. To paraphrase Billy Budd, "Empire is
what Empires do." In short, before one understands the significance of the use
of force under a self-defense logic, it is paramount to understand under which
international regime one is laboring. Why should we care about these
distinctions among the three regimes: balance of power, hegemony, and
empire? These distinctions are important because each regime establishes
different norms for legitimizing the use of force and for how alliances and
international institutions are established and maintained. Great powers act and
legitimize their actions differently under the three regimes and the
consequences are profound for the process of international stability and order.
25. RAYMOND ARON, PEACE AND WAR: A THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 151
(Transactions Publishers 2003) (1962).
26. There are a variety of "balance of power" variants as "balance of threat regimes." The
point for the argument is the requirement of one state to have to negotiate its view rather than just
impose it. See THE PENGUIN DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 41-44 (1998); Michael
Mastanduno, Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and US. Grand Strategy After the Cold
War, INT'L SECURITY, Spring 1997, at 49.
27. See ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD
POLITICAL ECONOMY 31 (1984).
28. ARON, supra note 25.
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Empires are usually only constrained by internal forces while hegemonic and
balance of power regimes are more concerned with external forces and
international norms and institutions. In all cases alliances are formed, but the
center of gravity of the alliances is different. The Oil Platforms case
highlights these issues.
In this "grand strategy political context," the first decision of note in the
Tanker War self-defense question is the decision by the United States, and
supporting allies, to "reflag" the Kuwaiti oil tankers. Why the policy choice
to "reflag?" By 1986 the number of ships being attacked by both belligerents
(Iran and Iraq) was on the rise.30 Increasingly, countries such as Japan,
Sweden, and Norway refused to call on Kuwait. Kuwait, believing that its
shipping was being targeted by Iran, requested the United States to register
eleven of its oil and gas tankers under the American flag. In agreeing to the
request, President Ronald Reagan stated the clear and essential U.S. interest in
the Persian Gulf by referencing the Carter Administration policy in the 1970s,
when oil and gas shortages reigned:
I'm determined that our national economy will never again be held
captive, that we will not return to the days of gas lines, shortages and
economic dislocation, and international humiliation. Mark this point well:
The use of sea lanes of the Persian Gulf will not be dictated by the
Iranians. These lanes will not be controlled by the Soviet Union. The
Persian Gulf will remain open to navigation by the nations of the world.
3 1
Ironically, given future events in the Gulf, the United States had chosen to
support Iraq over Iran at this juncture of Gulf War politics. In light of
international politics, the most significant point was that the United States had
stated that the lanes would remain open, and by reflagging the ships, the flow
of tankers would become a direct interest of the United States. Any attack on a
U.S. reflagged ship would become an attack on the United States.
International Relations theorist Robert Art, in his latest work to define a
grand strategy for America, argues that there are six nonpartisan principal
national interests of the United States: (1) prevent an attack on the American
homeland; (2) prevent great-power war and security competition in Eurasia;
(3) preserve access to reasonably priced and secure oil; (4) preserve open
international order; (5) foster the spread of democracy, respect human rights,
and prevent genocide; and (6) protect the global environment. 32 The Persian
Gulf Tanker War involved at least two vital principal interests-the flow of
oil and international order. Once the United States made the decision to reflag
29. In addition to the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union were also
requested to reflag Kuwaiti tankers. Belgium, France, Italy, and the Netherlands sent warships to the
Gulf to protect shipping. Oil Platforms, para. 24. See also JOHN W. PARTIN, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS
COMMAND HISTORY AND RESEARCH OFFICE, SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES IN OPERATION EARNEST
WILLIPRIME CHANCE I (1998).
30. The total number of ships attacked rose from 111 in 1986 to 181 in 1987. See PARTIN,
supra note 29, at 5.
31. Statement by President Ronald Reagan, May 19, 1987, quoted in id. at 6. As Partin points
out, the irony at the time was that Iraq had attacked more ships than Iran and that in May 1987, Iraqi
aircraft hit the USS Stark with two missiles and killed thirty-seven U.S. sailors. Id. at 6 n. 12.
32. ROBERT J. ART, A GRAND STRATEGY FOR AMERICA 7 (2003).
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the Kuwaiti tankers, the United States had signaled to the international
community that it would now shape the environment of how the Tanker War
would proceed. The projection of U.S. force was now on the international
table, and the United States would not be "indifferent" on the issue of the flow
of oil in the Gulf.
33
In retrospect, the only question, once the decision to reflag was made by
the United States, was if and when one of its ships was attacked, under what
process or theory would the U.S. decision to project force be questioned by
the world community? Note that this decision was done as an imperial act.
The international organs were basically silent on the issue of shipping channel
disruption and did not authorize an appropriate institutional response. 34 Rather
than forming an alternative alliance, or new forum, to establish a "coalition of
the willing" of the Great Powers and affected powers as a hegemon, the
United States in its role as sole guarantor of the system acted alone with its
client states to make clear that the shipping lanes would remain open. 35 To the
surprise of many, the organ for adjudication became the International Court of
Justice, after the fact. How did the issue of the use of force arise before the
International Court of Justice? How did a court envisioned primarily to handle
boundary and territorial disputes become the arbiter for the resolution of
collective security and self- defense issues? How else could the imperial
power be disciplined in the international context, or "hauled into court," for
allegedly breaking international law in the face of international institutional
silence on whether or now force could be used once reflagging made the
possibility inevitable?
IV. THE INTERNATIONAL SETTING FOR THE CASE: THE NICARAGUA
CONTEXT
In part the answer is that this case, and a score of others raising the
question of the use of force before the International Court of Justice, are the
progeny of Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua.
36
33. Id. at 223.
34. While it is true there were a number of U.N. Security Council Resolutions on the issue of
"The Situation Between Iran and Iraq," clear guidance never was issued. Although Resolution 552 is
directly on point and demanded that Iranian attacks on commercial ships "cease forthwith," the Council
only promises to revisit the issue in the event of non-compliance to "consider effective measures" to
ensure the freedom of navigation. S.C. Res. 552, U.N. SCOR, 39th Sess., 2546th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/552 (1984). As the subsequent Resolutions 582 and 598 reveal, although the Council was
"deeply concerned" and "deploring" of the hostilities surrounding the problem of disruption to neutral
shipping in the Gulf, no action was stipulated or authorized. See S.C. Res. 582, U.N. SCOR, 41st Sess.,
2666th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/582 (1986); S.C. Res. 598, U.N. SCOR, 42d Sess., 2750th mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/RES/598 (1987). Though an argument could be made that the Security Council did recognize
that disruptions were taking place, the Council never specifically authorized an appropriate response to
this particular international problem although it recognized that "these attacks constitute a threat to the
safety and stability of the area and have serious implications for international peace and security." S.C.
Res. 552, supra. See also William H. Taft, IV, Self-Defense and the Oil Platforms Decision, 29 YALE J.
INT'L L. 295, 296 n.4 (2004).
35. The concept of acting on behalf of the "public interest community" or "actio popularis" is
discussed in Pieter H.F. Bekker, Protecting International Shipping Channels During Hostilities and the
Oil Platforms Case: Actio Popularis Revisited, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 323 (2004).
36. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J.
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At the time of the Nicaragua case, the United States had assisted the armed
opposition (the "Contras") to the Nicaraguan government and was sued by the
government of Nicaragua in the International Court of Justice and accused of
violating Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, customary international law, the
Charter of the Organization of the American States, the national sovereignty
of Nicaragua, and the provisions of the 1956 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce,
and Navigation. 37 The private trade treaty between the United States and
Nicaragua became the basis of jurisdiction, similar to the 1955 Treaty of
Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights between the United States
and Iran, which forms the basis of jurisdiction for the Oil Platforms decision.
In the original Nicaragua case, the United States asserted a number of
arguments: (a) the need for other indispensable parties (El Salvador,
Honduras, and Costa Rica) to be part of the case; (b) the position that the
appropriate exclusive international organ to determine unlawful use of armed
force and interpretations of Article 51 for self-defense was the U.N. Security
Council; (c) the right of collective self-defense in responding to the requests
of El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica for assistance against armed
aggression under the terms of the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance and the use of regional organs to resolve the issues in dispute; and
(d) the view that in "ongoing" armed conflicts the tribunal lacked the
resources and means to establish evidence and that the resolution of the issues
should be by a political process. 38 When the International Court of Justice
rejected these defenses, the United States, in a dramatic show of procedural
force, withdrew from the proceedings. This act of withdrawal ironically was
the appropriate response of a hegemon. The rejection of jurisdiction outside
that of the Security Council was the way the United States signaled to the
other Great Powers of the United Nations, who possess veto power in the
Council, that there was a significant problem in allowing the Court to become
a legitimate forum for such a review. Despite the absence of the United States
as a party, the Court concluded that under its definition of an "armed attack"
under Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, Nicaragua's actions did not constitute
an "armed attack," although it was an "unlawful use of force." 39 The Court, in
reaching its decision, rejected numerous allegations against Nicaragua,
including the position that the alleged support of Nicaragua to the rebels in El
Salvador (the supply of arms and training) was an act of aggression
warranting an attack. Under the Court's interpretation, therefore, the United
States could not validly claim a right of collective self-defense. When
Nicaragua requested the Security Council to enforce the Court's order for
reparations, the United States exercised its veto right and vetoed subsequent
attempts. Faced with this impasse, Nicaragua proceeded to the General
14 (June 27).
37. See Andrew Coleman, The International Court of Justice and Highly Political Matters, 4
MELBOURNE J. INT'L L. 29,43-49 (2003) for an elegant summary of the issues.
38. For a summary of the defenses, see Christine Gray, The Use and Abuse of the
International Court of Justice: Cases Concerning the Use of Force After Nicaragua, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L.
867, 870-871 (2003).
39. See Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 123, para. 238; Coleman, supra
note 37, at 47. Needless to say the United States withdrawal and the Court's conclusion sparked much
commentary and debate. Coleman, supra note 37, at 47-49.
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Assembly of the United Nations and requested a resolution calling for
compliance with the Court order. The resolution eventually passed on
November 3, 1986, by ninety-three for, three opposed (United States, El
Salvador, and Israel) and forty-three abstaining.4°
V. THE INTERNATIONAL SETTING FOR THE CASE: THE UNITED NATIONS
CONTEXT
What is one to conclude from this tale of "use of force," "self-defense" and
the International Court of Justice? First, by asserting jurisdiction through the
mechanism of "private" trade treaties often enacted to promote harmonious
economic relations-and then using them as vehicles to adjudicate the proper
"use of force"-the International Court of Justice is developing the concept of
"shared sovereignty" among nations. By this process, objective tests of the
proper use of "self-defense" will become the international jus cogens rather
than a subjective test applied by a hegemon or imperial power. At a moment
in time in which the United States possesses unparalleled military power,
there clearly is no balance of power in the military arena. Through the creative
use of economic treaties-an arena where there exits a greater sense of multi-
polarity-bilateral trade treaties are being employed through the International
Court of Justice to generate legal norms of restraint on U.S. military
sovereignty. Economic legal power is being employed to cabin military use-
the doctrine of realism reversed. But "shared sovereignty" must be a doctrine
that first is based on a political foundation; only then can a legal framework be
established.
What is of note is the contrasting behavior of the United States in
Nicaragua and Oil Platforms. Whereas in the first case the United States
withdrew, by the time of the second suit, the United States counter-claimed.
By counter-claiming, the United States de jure recognized the jurisdictional
power of the Court and de facto legitimized the practice of using these
commercial clauses as a vehicle to adjudicate "use of force" claims.
From the vantage point of a small or weak state actor, such a strategic
approach is an ingenious and shrewd use of international jurisdiction through
the economic treaties negotiated in the late 1940s and 1950s as the new
international economic order was being established. Primarily bilateral private
trade treaties for economic interests are being metamorphosed into
international "clubs" to combat the projection of military force and foster
restraint. Thus when a plea is rejected by the Security Council, the Court is
ready, willing, and able to provide a forum for the claim. 41 This approach
raises the fundamental question of the function and role of the Court in the
Charter framework. As has been noted by students of the Charter, when it
comes to the power of the Court and the other organs of the Charter, there is
no equivalent statement of power relations as there is for the Security Council
40. G.A. Res. 41/31, U.N. GAOR, 53d mtg., para. 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/31 (1986);
Coleman, supra note 37, at 63 n.208.
41. Gray, supra note 38, at 881.
2004]
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 29: 291
and the General Assembly in Article 12.42 Can there be judicial review of
Security Council positions since the Court has maintained there is no doctrine
of separation of powers?
43
The Court carved out a role for opining on the right of self-defense as a
matter of customary international law in an Advisory Opinion, Legality of the
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons.44 For one school of judges, the Court is
"the principal judicial organ participating in the objectives of the maintenance
of international peace and security. ' 4 5 For another school of judges, cases over
the proper use of force are essentially political matters of negotiation and
should be left to the Security Council, General Assembly and the Secretary-
General. Law and politics are joined in this debate as the Court assumes the
role of arbiter of the use of force and becomes the fact finder. In Oil
Platforms, the Court as fact finder made determinations as to who and where
the missile came from and who was responsible for the mine based on
pleadings. The more general issue of maintaining the flow of oil from the Gulf
for reasons of international order, however, was not before the Court.
VI. CONCLUSION
Intriguingly, the international jurisprudential architecture is being
established in parallel with the power the Charter has reserved to the Security
Council. In this way, the evolving international norms outside and beyond the
veto power of the Security Council correspond to the power that has been
vested in the International Criminal Court.4y New centers of power within the
international framework of the United Nations are being developed that are
generating new norms for the adjudication of armed conflict. In effect, a new
nascent institutional reorganization is taking place, raising the question: what
is the appropriate role for each organ of the United Nations?
42. Id. at 898. Article 12 reads as follows:
1. While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation
the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall
not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless
the Security Council so requests.
2. The Secretary-General, with the consent of the Security Council, shall notify
the General Assembly at each session of any matters relative to the
maintenance of international peace and security which are being dealt with by
the Security Council and shall similarly notify the General Assembly, or the
Members of the United Nations if the General Assembly is not in session,
immediately [if] the Security Council ceases to deal with such matters.
U.N. CHARTER art. 12.
43. See Gray, supra note 38, at 898.
44. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8).
45. Gray, supra note 38, at 897. For example, in the separate opinion of Judge Simma in Oil
Platforms, he flatly states that he has voted in favor in the first part of the Judgment because he
"consider[s] it of utmost importance, and a matter of principle, for the Court to pronounce itself on
questions of the threat or use of force in international relations whenever it is given the opportunity to do
so." Oil Platforms (separate opinion of Judge Simma), para. 5.
46. Under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, the Security Council does not
have the power to veto investigations, and this neutering of the Council is one of the reasons why the
United States opposes ratifying the statute. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, United
Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9, http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm.
Symposium: Oil Platforms
The Oil Platforms case raises this question acutely, suggesting that the
naked "manatee" of the role of international law in the context of the use of
force and self-defense has clearly surfaced. The United States, in its role as an
actor in a balance of power system, hegemonic system, or imperial system,
has staked out its position on the use of force and self-defense, and has
expanded its view of national interest in a world fraught with terrorism. The
cacophony of international legal voices and international legal centers, when
enforcement of judgments is lacking, undermines the power and legitimacy of
the law. But what if the Court had spoken in one voice-would that have been
an "international legal norm founding moment?" Perhaps, if the opinion of the
judges truly would have represented a cross-section of great and significant
powers. Such "unanimity of voice" would have placed the United States on
notice that as a hegemon it was losing legitimacy with its allies and becoming
an imperial power-establishing and enforcing bilateral treaties based on
force and not international norms. This position would have been reinforced if
the Security Council, excepting a U.S. veto, passed a resolution to sanction the
United States for its actions. Ignoring such universal, worldwide
condemnation would have sharpened the distinction between hegemon on one
hand, and an imperial power acting unilaterally based on internal legitimacy
on the other. Yet one is still left with the question of why the United Nations
would have allowed the Tanker War to continue against third parties,
preferring to remain on the sideline? Without internationally sanctioned action
what is the fate of political order in the international regime?
Interestingly, in the immediate wake of September 11, 2001, the
Security Council, with the French representative chairing the Council,
unanimously passed Resolution 1368 condemning the terrorist acts and
expressing its "readiness to take all necessary steps to respond to the terrorist
attacks of 11 September 2001, and to combat all forms of terrorism, in
accordance with its responsibilities under the Charter of the United
Nations."47 This was the type of leadership in international law the founders
of the United Nations had envisioned for the Council. Moreover, a few weeks
later, again the Security Council acted by adopting Resolution 1373, one of
the most wide-ranging resolutions preventing, criminalizing, and advocating
the suppression of any financial support of terrorism.48 Where was the Council
in the Tanker War?
49
The algorithm of political power in the Oil Platforms case is as follows:
oil is an indispensable commodity; open sea lanes in the Persian Gulf are
indispensable pathways; the United States, because it has the power and the
Security Council was silent, took appropriate military action to make it clear
47. S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4370th mtg., para. 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368
(2001).
48. See Press Re'ease, U.N. Security Council, Security Council Unanimously Adopts Wide-
Ranging Anti-Terrorism Resolution (Sept. 28, 2001), U.N. Doc. SC/7158 (2001), at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sc7158.doc.htm.
49. As was noted by Judge Kooijmans, only in 1987 did the Security Council determine that
there was a breach of the peace and adopt a resolution under Chapter VII. Oil Platforms (separate
opinion of Judge Kooijmans), para. 8. Nor did the Security Council attribute specific violations to either
of the warring parties.
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to all parties that the oil and oil tankers would continue to flow for the benefit
of the international community.
This was a political, international order issue-so why had the Security
Council not made a declaration to such effect and acted to defend it? Why has
this become the purview of the International Court of Justice? The United
States used an economy of force in an effort to minimize casualties to achieve
its objective. Targeting strategic property related to the issue at hand--oil
platforms, the sources of revenue for the regime. The United States took such
action at the behest of neutral states being adversely affected by the attacks.
This was a political decision that used appropriate force proportionally to
achieve the objective. Today would the United States, faced with a similar
problem in the Gulf, react differently in the face of the current findings in the
case on self-defense? I think not. Would the Security Council faced with a
similar problem in the Gulf, react differently in the face of the current findings
in the case on self-defense? I think not.
The United States, if attacked once again, would nakedly assert its right
to self-defense as the guarantor of international order. Would it be wrong, as a
matter of international law as interpreted by the International Court of Justice;
the Security Council; the latest "coalition of the willing"; or the Congress of
the United States? Ultimately the case raises the following question: in a
world where international legal norms are being debated over fundamental
questions regarding the "use of force," should we not, as internationalists
(regardless of the regime we are under), be exploring ways to confront this
issue as an international political question of the first order? What are to be
the new "burdens of proof' required before force can be used against a state or
non-state actor under the principles of jus ad bellum, and proportionality
underjus in bello? Is the concept of "self-defense" different in a world where
state actors are not the only entities that can inflict devastating damage? If we
do not have this discussion, and continue to jerry-rig jurisdictions in fora not
established for such issues, or if we use fora where international law has no
sway-whither the manatee of international law?
